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THE COLOMBIAN ROYALTY SYSTEM:




NE year ago, Colombians wondered if the government of newly
elected president Alvaro Uribe would live up to its promises.'
Uribe campaigned on putting an end to the guerrilla conflict and
orchestrating peace. Uribe, like the country's previous president, Pas-
trana,2 has compromised his image with the willingness to negotiate a
peace treaty with insurgent groups, who are as likely to agree to it as the
government is willing to stick to its word. 3
The battle between settling the armed conflict through negotiation or
force brings Colombia face to face with the economic crisis suffered by
the country, especially with unemployment reaching 19 percent and a
slump in the number of energy contracts being signed and developed. 4
Colombia, now largely dependent on oil and gas exploration 5 and devel-
opment contracts, suffers from a slowing worldwide economy and the de-
crease in foreign capital expenditures.6 The new royalty system is a
reasonable solution in an effort to increase foreign investment.
I. THE IMPACT OF THE OIL MARKET IN COLOMBIA'S
ECONOMY
The petroleum industry in Colombia has an enormous impact on the
economy, with the oil sector representing 4.5 percent of the gross domes-
tic product.7 Colombia "seems poised for a period of sustained economic
*The author is a 2004 J.D. candidate at Southern Methodist University Dedman
School of Law.
1. Energy Information Administration, Colombia Country Analysis Brief, available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/colombia.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2002).
2. See Jorge L. Esquirol, Can International Law Help? An Analysis of the Colombian
Peace Process, 16 CONN. J. INT'L L. 23, 31 (2000).
3. Alicia Puyana, Colombia: Prospects for the Oil Industry, at http://www.cera.com
(last visited Sept. 20, 2002).
4. See id.
5. Juan Carlos Palau, Transactional, Social, and Legal Aspects of Oil Exploration and
Extraction in Colombia, 22 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 35, 36 (2001).
6. Puyana, supra note 3.
7. Fossil Energy International, An Energy Overview of Colombia, available at http://
www.fe.doe.gov/international/colbover.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2002).
190 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 9
development" with improving development factors including political
stability, debt reduction, new fiscal policy, economic development, and
government non-intervention in the form of privatization.9
Today, Colombia is ranked fifth in Latin America for crude oil produc-
tion.a0 It achieved self-sufficient oil energy status in the early 1970s, only
to require oil imports again in 1976.11 As most worldwide projects in
exploration and production surfaced in the decade of the seventies, Co-
lombia saw the oil industry contributing largely to its gross domestic
product.12 These "black gold" sales amounted to 20 percent of Colom-
bia's total exports, with prices averaging $20 a barrel; the oil business
contributes $1.8 billion annually in taxation and royalty checks to the Co-
lombian government.' 3 As of 2001, oil and gas derivative exports make
up 25 percent of Colombia's revenues, but crude oil production fell in
production figures from 604,399 BPD (barrels of oil per day) to 540,000
BPD forecasted for the 2002 calendar year. 14
A climate of violence persists in Colombia with the emergence of "re-
source curse" gangs. These insurgent groups flourished through the im-
plemented pipeline distribution locations in the country by bombing the
major pipelines in Colombia. 15 This results in the country's untapped oil
reserves remaining unproductive. 16 Only 20 percent of the country's po-
tential oil territories have actually been surveyed and explored, a factor
reflecting the difficult investment climate for foreign multinationals. 17
Insurgent organizations like National Liberation Army (ELN) and
Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC) have named oil com-
panies, in particular Occidental Petroleum and Spanish-owned Repsol, as
prospective military targets for actively working in the oil fields.' 8 The
guerrilla groups have bombed Colombia's oil pipelines more than 1,000
times since 1986, creating a negative atmosphere for capital inflows by
portraying a dangerous image of the country. 19 In 2001, these two armed
groups bombed the nationally renowned Caflo Lim6n pipeline in excess
8. Jay G. Martin, Venezuela as an Opportunity for Investment in the Petroleum Indus-
try, 20 ENERGY L. J. 325 (1999); Thomas W. Waelde, International Energy Invest-
ment, 17 ENERGY L. J. 191, 196 (1996).
9. See Mario Andrade & Mario A. de Castro, The Privatization and Project Finance
Adventure: Acquiring a Colombian Public Utility Company, 19 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 425, 444 (1999). See also Martin, supra note 8; Waelde, supra note 8.
10. Fossil Energy International, supra note 7.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Puyana, supra note 3.
14. Mary Morrison, Colombian Congress Ok's New Range for Oil Royalty Tax, availa-
ble at http://www.petroleumworld.com/story8377.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2002).
15. Fossil Energy International, supra note 7.
16. Energy Information Administration., supra note 1.
17. Thad Dunning & Leslie Wirpsa, Oil Rigged, available at http://www.
globalpolicy.orglsecurity/natres/oil/2001/O2Olcolo.htm (Feb. 2001).
18. Energy Information Administration, supra note 1; see Esquirol, supra note 2, at 30-
31.
19. Dunning, supra note 17.
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of 170 times. 20 The latest incident on September 30, 2002, affected pro-
duction in 3,000 BPD of the 100,000 BPD produced in this field. 21 Due to
these security risks, not only are foreign multinationals wary about pro-
spective financial investments in the country, they inherently fear for the
safety of their partners and employees. 22
Nearly 80 percent of the country's unexplored territory awaits a more
stable investment climate. 23 Though Colombia and its oil-rich neighbors
(primarily Venezuela) import more oil derivatives to the United States
than all Persian Gulf countries combined, 24 pipeline bombings25 and
kidnappings create an unwanted image to potential investors.26
II. COLOMBIA'S ASSOCIATION CONTRACT
Despite obvious threats to Colombia's economic lifeline, investment in
the oil industry has begun to moderately improve as the number of signed
contracts in 2002-2003 has increased. 27 The slight improvements in the
oil industry28 are bolstered by new discoveries, such as the Guando field
in nearby BogotA, which add to the overall enthusiasm in the industry.2 9
The government and Ecopetrol, the state oil company, recognize the
situation, and must encourage both a more favorable investment climate
and a friendlier business place 30 "to attract foreign investment for explo-
ration and exploitation of additional sources and the existing ones."'3 1
Since its inception, Ecopetrol manages all association contracts32 and
constitutes the vehicle through which investment capital is applied. 33 As
oil prices rose deeply in the early 1970's, the Colombian government de-
cided to make some important changes to exploration and production
policies. The most important change to the association contract was the
20. Energy Information Administration, supra note 1.
21. Ecopetrol, Atentados en Pozos de Cafio Lim6n [Bombings in Cafio Limon], availa-
ble at http://www.ecopetrol.com.co/newslnot30-O9-02.htm (Sept. 30, 2002).
22. See Dunning, supra note 17.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. But see Charles Roth, As Oil Prices Rise, Andean Region's Crude Output Sags,
available at http://www.petroleumworld.comstoryT336.htm (August 27, 2002)
(showing that in 2002, attacks have been reduced to five per month, compared to
fourteen in 2001, thus allowing higher production numbers and increased exports
of Caflo Lim6n crude to the United States.)
26. See Energy Information Administration, supra note 1; see also Dunning, supra
note 17.
27. Puyana, supra note 3.
28. See id.
29. Fossil Energy International, supra note 7; see also Ecopetrol, El Campo ya Com-
plet6 su Primer Mill6n de Barriles de Producci6n [The Field Completed its First
Million Barrels Per Day], available at http://www.ecopetrol.com.com/news/not31l-
05-02.htm (May 31, 2002).
30. Puyana, supra note 3.
31. Palau, supra note 5, at 36.
32. Association contract is the term given to a signed contract between the foreign
investment company and Ecopetrol.
33. See Ecopetrol, Empresa Colombiana de Petr6leos, available at http://www.
ecopterol.com.co/inge/ecopet/localiza.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2002).
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adjustment from fixed oil prices to international levels of the
commodity.34
Prior to the 1973 adjustment, foreign investors had the right to sell and
Ecopetrol had the right to buy production at fixed petroleum prices that
it determined. 35 The inability to command international premiums at the
time of the OPEC oil embargo made investment in Colombia's petro-
leum industry unpopular.36 Once the adjustment took place in the associ-
ation contract, foreign investors started reaping larger benefits from
international petroleum prices. No longer depressed, prices skyrocketed
and Colombia was able to attract foreign investment capital to its oil
fields. After the biggest oil discovery in 1989, Caflo Lim6n, Ecopetrol
created a sliding-scale production-sharing agreement targeted at larger
deposits. 37 These larger deposits allowed Ecopetrol to demand a higher
rent for production figures. Most international companies with active in-
vestments in South America were not enthusiastic about this sliding scale
agreement and concluded Ecopetrol was taking up too large a share
whenever most convenient.38
In 1994, the Colombian Congress and Ecopetrol, the main two agents
in the policy-making process, adjusted this sliding scale production-shar-
ing feature of the association contract to lure more foreign capital into
the energy industry.39 The association contract incorporated the "R" fac-
tor, eliminating the sliding scale system. 40 Under the "R" factor system,
production is split fifty/fifty for each partner until costs are recovered or
production exceeds sixty million BPD.41 Thereafter, the government's
take on production increases up to 75 percent. 42 Despite the changes in
the contracting system, the royalties remained too generous with the
State, and with safety issues at their worst levels, a new legislative ap-
proach was needed in order to correct the lack of foreign investment.
III. LEGISLATING TOWARDS A MORE DIVERSE AND
ATTRACTIVE ROYALTY SYSTEM
In June 2002, the Colombian Congress signed into law the amendment
to the royalty rate in exploration and development projects. It sets out a
royalty scale on the daily production rate on a monthly average produc-
tion basis.43
34. Armando Zamora, Fourth Generation Association Contracts in Colombia: Has the










43. Ecopetrol, Fiscal Aspects, at http://www.ecopetrol.com.co/vep/engl/finan-
cialaspects-royalties.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2002).
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CHART 1
Royalty Rate for Monthly average of daily oil production
5,000 bpd or less 5%
above 5,000 bpd and below 125,000 bpd 5-20% straight line
above 125,000 bpd and below 400,000 bpd 20%
above 400,000 bpd and below 600,000 bpd 20-25% straight line
600,000 bpd or more 25%
From a previous fixed rate of 20 percent royalty on production across
the board, 44 Colombia took steps to create a sliding scale royalty deter-
mined on the amount of production recovered from the ground. First,
royalties now start at 5 percent on production up to 5,000 BPD, which
will gradually increase until 20 percent is reached at levels between
200,000 and 400,000 BPD. At 400,000 BPD, the royalty increases again
until it finally reaches 25 percent at production levels of 600,000 BPD.
Production levels over 600,000 BPD cap the royalty rate at 25 percent. 45
Ecopetrol's participation in the joint venture is lowered from 50 to 30
percent, 46 making participation in exploration and development much
more attractive to foreign investment companies willing to take the in-
vestment risk. The country's economic conditions, prospects, environ-
mental regulations, legal security, and public order are factors weighed
when deciding to participate in a risk project, 47 for which the industry is
well known for.48
Despite a growing number of signed contracts, which largely depend on
the Colombian Congress passing the new royalty amendment into law,
the new reinvigoration in exploration activity is still lower than in past
years.49 The year 2000 marked another declining year "with investments
of $140 million, only half of the peak level" registered for the 1992 calen-
dar year. 50 During 2001, Ecopetrol saw total investments surpass 2000's
by more than double, but still below 1997-98 levels. 51 Ecopetrol's invest-
ment in exploration peaked at about $20 million for 2001.52
Even though the Colombian Congress made it more appealing for for-
eign investment firms to invest in Colombia's oil industry, the lack of in-
44. Business News Americas, President Stamps New Royalty Law-Colombia, at http:/
/www.Bnamericas.com (last visited Oct. 5, 2002).
45. Law No. 126, June 19, 2001. Article 16, (by which Law 141, 1994 is modified).
46. Ecopetrol, New Oil Policy for Colombia, at http://www.ecopetrol.com.co/prin/re-
view/carta/ju199/infor59b.htm; see also Energy Info. Admin., supra note 1.
47. Ecopetrol, New Oil Policy for Colombia, supra note 46.
48. Id.
49. Ecopetrol, Crece Exploraci6n Petrolera en Putumayo [Petroleum Exploration
Grows in Putumayo], at http://www.ecopetrol.com.co/news/not06-08-02.htm (Au-
gust 6, 2002): see also Oil and Gas International, Argosy Energy Scores More
Favorable Terms from Ecopetrol, at http://www.oilandgasinternational.com/depart-
ments/licensing-concessions/aug02-argosy.html (August 6, 2002).
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vestment by Ecopetrol and international companies in association
contracts and the lack of discoveries such as Caflo Lim6n or Cusiana in
the 1994-2000 period 53 impact the decline of reserves. At its peak, these
fields added a total of 129 million barrels of oil in new reserves, 54 a posi-
tive and encouraging factor for attracting international capital. As OPEC
tries to regulate oil prices in the $22-28 range, Ecopetrol still needs to
sign more contracts to encourage a higher level of discovery, which in
turn gives new life to added reserves and the sliding scale royalty system
now in place. 55
These new amendments to the royalty rate in Colombia are instrumen-
tal in bringing about a different level of foreign capital to the country. 56
As security measures increase, it would be very difficult to sustain the
level of royalty rate. The final effect would be the aversion of foreign
companies to risk their employees' security, their goals, and their budg-
ets. The equation becomes rather simple for the Colombian congressmen
adjusting the law; as social circumstances deteriorate, one must alleviate
the economic burden.
Colombia's possible benefit from the exploration of oil is immense. Not
only will foreign capital supply a much needed source of government rev-
enue in the form of royalty, but it will also allow Ecopetrol to increase its
investment in the fields and take on more responsibility as operator and
sole owner of reserves. Ecopetrol has decided to invest $610 million in
direct exploration for 2002 through 2006, doubling current investment
rates from Colombia's state oil company. 57 The company has set aside
nearly 19 percent of the 5 billion in investment dollars for new association
contracts.5 8
Congress's change to the royalty rate is not a gamble. The country's
previous discoveries of oil and the subsoil's richness in hydrocarbons are
two very positive facts that support its decision. First, the crude discov-
ered so far has been light; and second, 59 the country's comparatively low
domestic consumption levels leave aside a larger share of oil export ca-
pacity than would be expected. 60 The surplus profit created by a slowing
use of energy in the country invariably leads to more allocated funds for
social as well as economic needs. This surplus could be reinvested in the
substantial new exploration Ecopetrol must embark on if it wants to dis-
cover new and necessary oil reserves. A cycle of sustained growth must
develop if the energy sector is to jumpstart the Colombian economy. 61
53. Fossil Energy International, supra note 7.
54. Puyana, supra note 3.
55. Morrison, supra note 14.
56. Business News Americas, supra note 44.
57. Puyana, supra note 3.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Palau, supra note 5, at 36.
61. Puyana, supra note 3.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Colombia's economy is, and will continue to be, largely dependent
upon the government revenues of its energy industry. After four differ-
ent association contracts, the Colombian Congress adopted a sliding scale
royalty rate that should not only increase the number of contracts signed,
but also create a new wave of domestic exploration through Ecopetrol.
Although unemployment and violence are still issues to be addressed,
Colombia's energy sector has an advantage with respect to its undiscov-
ered reserves and its ability to export crude oil. For further economic
recovery to occur, the slowing world economy must gain some of its lost
momentum. The Colombian government officials and private sector en-
trepreneurs must also develop a strategy to attract foreign capital into
Colombia's petroleum business. A surplus in crude oil in the form of
royalties and exports will give the Colombian population a much needed
source of revenue, which is committed to satisfy social and economic
necessities.
As 2002 comes to an end, Ecopetrol has actively doubled its investment
funds for the energy sector. If the whole country is to benefit from these
economic investments, all Colombians must also take part by acknowl-
edging the crisis, and by stopping the violence and corruption. A joint
effort, the revenues obtained from exploration and development of
crude, are only one side of a much larger and more important issue: the
recovery of national respect and the ability to look forward to a prosper-
ous future. Only then will Colombians enjoy their beautiful land and its
natural resources.
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NOTICE OF ERRATA
To the Subscribers of Law and Business Review of the Americas:
In the article, "Corporate Governance: A Perspective" from Volume 9,
No. 1, Winter 2003, Mr. Busbee's bio was omitted. We apologize to the
author and subscribers for this omission.
Mr. Dan Busbee, S.J.D., SMU School of Law 1962; Adjunct Professor
and Senior Fellow at the SMU Institute of International Banking and Fi-
nancial, Southern Methodist University, Dedman School of Law; and Vis-
iting Senior Fellow at the Centre For Commercial Law Studies,
University of London.
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